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Basic Rules of International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts


Basic Rules of International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts

The seven fundamental rules which are the basis of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols:

1 – Persons hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and their moral and physical integrity. They shall in all circumstances be protected and treated humanely without any adverse distinction.

2 – It is forbidden to kill or injure an enemy who surrenders or who is hors de combat.

3 – The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for by the party to the conflict which has them in its power. Protection also covers medical personnel, establishments, transports and equipment. The emblem of the red
cross or the red crescent is the sign of such protection and must be respected.

4 – Captured combatants and civilians under the authority of an adverse party are entitled to respect for their lives, dignity, personal rights and convictions. They shall be protected against all acts of violence and reprisals. They shall have the right to correspond with their families and to receive relief.

5 – Everyone shall be entitled to benefit from fundamental judicial guarantees. No one shall be held responsible for an act he has not committed. No one shall be subjected to physical or mental torture, corporal punishment or cruel or degrading treatment.

6 – Parties to a conflict and members of their armed forces do not have an unlimited choice of methods and means of warfare. It is prohibited to employ weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering.

7 – Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants in order to spare civilian population and property. Neither the civilian population as such nor civilian persons shall be the object of attack. Attacks shall be directed solely against military objectives.

1954 It is a comparison of our legal provisions with the Criminal Procedure Code and the proposed Code of Criminal Procedure.


1954 It is a comparison of our legal provisions with the Criminal Procedure Code and the proposed Code of Criminal Procedure.

Under our current Criminal Procedure Code Rule 63, a person loses his right to bail if he has been charged with a crime punishable by more than 15 years and the injured person is expected to die or die. Although there is no consensus among legal experts on the interpretation of the article, the interpretation that many legal scholars agree on and that is in line with human rights provisions is that the law deprives a person of the right to bail only when two conditions are met.
If one person is killed or injured, the person is expected to die tomorrow, and the other is sentenced to more than 15 years in prison if the person is charged or suspected of a crime. In addition, other proclamations stipulate that a person suspected of terrorism or corruption for more than a decade is not entitled to bail.
Under Section 154 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, however, a person suspected of a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death (whether or not the person died as a result of the crime) is denied bail. Also, a person suspected of corruption under Article 154 (2) shall not be released on bail if the type of offense is punishable by more than ten years or if he is convicted of multiple corruption offenses and the sentence may be more than ten years. In addition, under Article 154 (1) of the same law, crimes against the Constitution and the constitutional order, crimes against the State Security and Defense Forces, terrorism, human trafficking, and rape of women and children are denied bail. ፡ Searching
Now, in the 1954 draft. The big difference between the law is that under current law, a person does not lose his or her right to bail unless he or she has committed suicide or the victim has died and the alleged crime (homicide) is punishable by more than 15 years. In other words, under current law, a defendant could not be sentenced to life imprisonment and up to 15 years in prison unless convicted of murder. This means that if the courts think that the person will be acquitted or found guilty of murder, they will be granted bail, even if the crime is not related to murder. In contrast, under the current Criminal Procedure Code, if a person is charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death, the right to bail is prohibited. On the one hand, under current law, defendants who have been charged with aggravated manslaughter and are not liable to life imprisonment or death penalty for a crime punishable by up to 20 years will be released on bail when the draft law is enacted. On the other hand, under the current law, people who have been released on bail for crimes related to human life but not for life or death will be denied bail when the bill is passed by parliament.
According to the author, the draft law has two unfair consequences.
First of all, why should a person be denied bail because he is suspected or charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death?
50 years ago, our law concluded that even if a person is charged with a crime punishable by life imprisonment, his right to bail should not be denied except by the decision of a judge and a conscientious objection, how can the rights of these people be promoted when the world is civilized and our country recognizes international human rights? Are we going backwards? The reason for the release of a suspect on bail is Article 20 (3) of our Constitution, which states that a person has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and convicted in a court of law, in accordance with international human rights law and conventions. That is to say. In particular, the accused has the constitutional and human right to be released on bail so that he or she can be returned to his or her home and not be harmed. He should also have the right to stand on his own two feet to defend himself so that he does not become a victim. The right to bail should not be denied as much as possible, since even if the person has done something wrong, the only way to present his case and give a fair trial is if the person has collected the evidence on bail. There is no compelling and valid reason for the legislature to relinquish the power to release suspects on bail in cases of life and death. Constitutional human rights should not be restricted unless there is a good reason and no alternative. In fact, when restricted, the restrictions should be as small and reasonable as possible. Instead, instead of denying the accused the right to bail in Article 156, the bill introduces new and innovative ideas to prevent the defendant from posting bail, moving away from a place or participating in certain places in accordance with the provisions of Articles 134 to 156 of the Criminal Code. While judges can use these practices, instead of leaving the jurisdiction to the courts to determine the rights of people convicted of crimes punishable by life imprisonment, it is unfair to deny the rights of the Proclamation and not to use other alternatives. Recognizing that the defendant is likely to be acquitted, the judges in each case will be able to decide (revoke the bail), but the revocation of the judges’ power and the general revocation of the bail will not be appropriate unless it is absolutely necessary and optional. Our courts have many problems, but we need to trust them. In this regard, both the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation and the Anti-Corruption Proclamation need to be re-examined. Crimes against the constitutional order, defense, and security were also reported in 1954. According to the current and current law, unless the loss of life is a criminal offense, but in the draft law, the loss of life of the suspects is not a matter of enrichment of the law, but a matter of justice.
According to the author, this is not the end of the draft law. According to the draft law, those charged with aggravated homicide (excluding extrajudicial killings) will be released on bail even if the victim dies. In 1954, which is currently under construction. Under the Penal Code, however, a person charged with murder is not released on bail. It is extremely difficult in our country to be released on bail, even if the suspect is innocent, even if the suspect is innocent, even if he or she is innocent enough to kill us because of negligence or incapacity, or because of a deliberate murder and bloodshed. If the killer disappears after being released on bail, the moral damage to the family and the community will be severely curtailed. In addition to the traditional law and practice of bloodshed and self-inflicted revenge in many areas, the fact that he himself is a suspect and has disappeared will lead his innocent family to revenge and endless bloodshed. Therefore, according to the author, allowing people who are suspected of killing a person with serious negligence (punishable by up to 15 years in prison) or murder (as a result of a bloodbath) may be more dangerous and harmful to society.
Restricting the right to bail of people suspected of murder and aggravated murder by law is proportional and constitutional, as it protects the suspects themselves from retaliation and protects the community from bloodshed.
In conclusion, our draft Criminal Procedure Code, 1954, is currently in force. People who have been charged with aggravated or aggravated murder or genocide and other similar war crimes should be deprived of their bail only if the victim is expected to die or die. Apart from this, the guarantee should not be revoked only for crimes that have resulted in loss of life or death and are punishable by more than 16 years, but should not be enacted by a proclamation that guarantees the right to bail for those charged with backwardness and life imprisonment, but not for murder. .

በ1954 ዓ.ም. በወጣው የወንጀለኛ መቅጫ ሕግ ሥነ ሥርዓት ሕጋችንና በመረቀቅ ላይ ባለው የወንጀል ሥነ ሥርዓት ሕግ መካከል ዋስትና በሕግ የሚከለከልበትን ሁኔታ ማነፃፀርና የመፍትሔ አስተያየት መሰንዘር ነው፡፡

አሁን ሥራ ላይ ባለው የወንጀለኛ መቅጫ ሕግ ሥነ ሥርዓት ሕጋችን ቁጥር 63 መሠረት አንድ ሰው በዋስትና የመለቀቅ መብቱን የሚያጣው ከ15 ዓመት በላይ በሚያስቀጣ ወንጀል የተከሰሰ እንደሆነና በወንጀሉ ጉዳት የደረሰበት ሰው የሞተ ወይም ይሞታል ተብሎ የሚጠበቅ እንደሆነ ነው፡፡ ምንም እንኳን በሕግ ባለሙያዎች መካከል ስለአንቀጹ አተረጓጎም ስምምነት ባይኖርም በርካታ የሕግ ምሁራን የሚቀበሉትና ከሰብዓዊ መብት ድንጋጌዎች ጋር የሚጣጣመው አተረጓጎም አንድ ሰው በዋስ የመለቀቅ መብቱን ሕግ የሚነፍገው ሁለት ነገር ሲሟላ ብቻ ነው፡፡
አንደኛው ሰው ከገደለ ወይም ጉዳት ያደረሰበት ሰው ከዛሬ ነገ ይሞታል ተብሎ የሚጠበቅ ሲሆን ሁለተኛው ደግሞ ሰውዬው የተከሰሰበት ወይም የተጠረጠረበት የወንጀል ዓይነት ከ15 ዓመት በላይ የሚያስቀጣ ከሆነ ነው፡፡ ከዚህ ውጪ በሽብርተኝነት ወይም ከአሥር ዓመት በላይ በሚያስቀጣ ሙስና ወንጀል የተጠረጠረ ሰው የዋስ መብቱ እንደማይጠበቅለት በሌሎች አዋጆች ተደንግጓል፡፡
እየተረቀቀ ባለው የወንጀል ሥነ ሥርዓት ሕግ ቁጥር 154 (3) መሠረት ግን በዕድሜ ልክ ወይም በሞት በሚያስቀጣ ወንጀል የተጠረጠረ ሰው (በወንጀሉ የተነሳ ሰው ሞተም አልሞተም) በዋስትና የመለቀቅ መብቱን በሕግ ተከልክሏል፡፡ እንዲሁም በዚሁ ድንጋጌ ቁጥር 154 (2) መሠረት በሙስና ወንጀል የተጠረጠረ ሰው የወንጀሉ ዓይነት ከአሥር ዓመት በላይ የሚያስቀጣ ከሆነ ወይም በተደራራቢ የሙስና ወንጀሎች ተከሶ ቅጣቱ ተደማምሮ ከአሥር ዓመት በላይ ሊበልጥ የሚችል ከሆነ በዋስትና መለቀቅ አይችልም፡፡ በተጨማሪም በዚሁ በረቂቁ ሕግ ቁጥር 154 (1) መሠረት በሕገ መንግሥቱና በሕገ መንግሥታዊው ሥርዓት ላይ የሚፈጸሙ ወንጀሎች፣ በመንግሥት የውጭ ደኅንነትና መከላከያ ኃይል ላይ የሚፈጸሙ ወንጀሎች፣ የሽብርተኝነት ወንጀል፣ የሕገወጥ የሰው ዝውውር ወንጀል፣ በሴቶችና በሕፃናት ላይ በሚፈጸም አስገድዶ የመድፈር ወንጀል የተጠረጠረ ሰው በዋስትና የመለቀቅ መብቱን ተነፍጓል፡፡
እንግዲህ በረቂቁና ሥራ ላይ ባለው የ1954 ዓ.ም. ሕግ መካከል ትልቁ ልዩነት አሁን ሥራ ላይ ባለው ሕግ መሠረት አንድ ሰው (የፀረ ሙስናና የፀረ ሽብር አዋጆች እንደተጠበቁ ሆኖ) ነፍስ ካላጠፋ ወይም ተጎጂው የሚሞት ካልሆነና የተጠረጠረበትም ወንጀል (የነፍስ ግድያ ዓይነት) ከ15 ዓመት በላይ የሚያስቀጣ ካልሆነ በስተቀር በሕግ በዋስትና የመለቀቅ መብቱን አያጣም፡፡ በሌላ አባባል አሁን በሚሠራበት ሕግ መሠረት አንድ ተከሳሽ የሰው ነፍስ ካላጠፋ በስተቀር የተጠረጠረበት ወንጀል 15 ዓመት ቀርቶ በዕድሜ ልክና በሞት ሊያስቀጣ ቢችልም እንኳን በዋስትና የመለቀቅ መብቱ በአዋጅ አልተገፈፈም፡፡ ይህ ማለት ግን ፍርድ ቤቶች ሰውየው ቢለቀቅ የሚጠፋ ከመሰላቸው ወይም ማስረጃ የሚያጠፋ ሆኖ ካገኙት ወንጀሉ ከነፍስ ግድያ ጋር ባይያያዝም ዋስትና የመንፈግ ሥልጣን የተሰጣቸው መሆኑ እንደተጠበቀ ሆኖ ነው፡፡ በአንፃሩ ግን እየተረቀቀ ባለው የወንጀል ሥነ ሥርዓት ሕግ መሠረት ግን ቁም ነገሩ የሰው ነፍስ መጥፋት አለመጥፋት መሆኑ ቀርቶ አንድ ሰው በዕድሜ ልክ ወይም በሞት በሚያስቀጣ ወንጀል ከተከሰሰ በዋስ የመለቀቅ መብቱ በሕግ ሊከለከል ነው፡፡ በአንድ በኩል አሁን ባለው ሕግ መሠረት በዋስ ሊለቀቁ የማይችሉ በዕድሜ ልክና በሞት ሳይሆን በ20 ዓመት ብቻ በሚያስቀጣ የተራ ነፍስ ግድያ ወንጀል የተከሰሱና ጉዳት ያደረሱበት ሰው የሞተ (ይሞታል ተብሎ የሚጠበቅ) ተከሳሾች ረቂቁ ሕግ አዋጅ ሆኖ በሚወጣበት ጊዜ በዋስ ሊለቀቁ ነው፡፡ በሌላ በኩል አሁን ባለው ሕግ መሠረት በዋስ ሊለቀቁ የሚችሉ ከሰው ሕይወት ጋር በማይያያዝ ነገር ግን እስከ ዕድሜ ልክ ወይም ሞት በሚደርስ በሚያስቀጡ ወንጀሎች የተከሰሱ ሰዎች ረቂቁ ሕግ በፓርላማ በሚፀድቅበት ጊዜ የዋስ መብታቸው ሊነፈግ ነው፡፡
እንደ ጽሑፍ አቅራቢው እምነት ከሆነ ረቂቅ ሕጉ ኢፍትሐዊ የሆኑ ሁለት ውጤቶችን ያስከትላል፡፡
በመጀመርያ አንድ ሰው እስከ ዕድሜ ልክ ወይም ሞት ድረስ በሚያስቀጣ ወንጀል ስለተጠረጠረ ወይም ስለተከሰሰ ብቻ ለምን በዋስ ወጥቶ የመከራከር መብቱን ይነፈጋል?
ከዛሬ 50 ዓመት በፊት የወጣው ሕጋችን አንድ ሰው እስከ ዕድሜ ልክና ሞትም ድረስ በሚያስቀጣ ወንጀል ቢከሰስም እንኳን በዳኞች ውሳኔና የህሊና ፍርድ ካልሆነ በስተቀር በዋስትና የመለቀቅ መብቱን በአዋጅ ሊነፈግ አይገባም የሚል አቋም ይዞ ሲያበቃ፣ አሁን ዓለም በሠለጠነችበትና አገራችንም ዓለም አቀፍ ሰብዓዊ መብቶችን ባፀደቀችበት ወቅት እንዴት የእነኝህን ሰዎች መብት በአዋጅ በመግፈፍ ወደ ኋላ እንጓዛለን? በወንጀል የተጠረጠረ ሰው በዋስ እንዲለቀቅ የሚፈቀድለት ምክንያት በሕገ መንግሥታችን አንቀጽ 20 (3) ላይ አንድ ሰው በወንጀል ተከሶ፣ ጥፋተኝነቱ በማስረጃ ተረጋግጦ በፍርድ ቤት ጥፋተኛ ነው ተብሎ ካልተወሰነበት በስተቀር ንጹሕ ሆኖ የመገመት (እንደጥፋተኛ ያለመቆጠር) መብት አለው የሚለውንና በዓለም አቀፍ ሰብዓዊ መብት ድንጋጌዎችና ስምምነቶች ተቀባይነት ያለውን መርህ ለመተግባር ሲባል ነው፡፡ በተለይም የተከሰሰው ሰው በእስር ሆኖ ጉዳዩ ሲታይ ቆይቶ በኋላ ንፁህ መሆኑ የተረጋገጠ እንደሆነ ሊመለስና ሊተካ የማይችል ጉዳት እንዳይደርስበት ሲባል በዋስ የመለቀቅ ሕገ መንግሥታዊና ሰብዓዊ መብት አለው፡፡ እንዲሁም በሥሩ የሚረዳቸው ወይም የሚያግዛቸው ሰዎች ካሉ ከራሱ አልፎ እነሱም ተጎጂ እንዳይሆኑ ሲባል በዋስ ወጥቶ የመከራከር መብቱ ሊከበርለት ይገባል፡፡ ሌላው ቀርቶ ሰውዬው በተወሰነ ደረጃ በትክክል ያጠፋም እንኳን ቢሆን በእሱ በኩል ያለውን ማስረጃ በትክክል ለማቅረብና በእውነት ላይ የተመረኮዘ ፍርድ ለመስጠት የሚቻለው ሰውዬው በዋስ ሆኖ እንደልቡ ማስረጃዎቹን አሰባስቦ የተከራከረ እንደሆነ ብቻ ስለሆነ የዋስትና መብት በተቻለ መጠን ፈጽሞ በአዋጅ ሊከለከል አይገባም፡፡ ሕግ አውጪው እስከ ዕድሜ ልክና በሞት ሊያስቀጣ በሚችል ጉዳይ የተጠረጠሩ ሰዎችን በዋስ የመልቀቅና ያመልቀቅ ሥልጣንን ከዳኞች ላይ ቀምቶ የሁሉንም ተጠርጣሪዎች መብት በአዋጅ የሚገፍበትና በፊት የነበረውን ሕግ የሚያጠብቅበት አጥጋቢና ተቀባይነት ያለው ምክንያት የለውም፡፡ ሕገ መንግሥታዊ ሰብዓዊ መብቶች አጥጋቢና በቂ ምክንያት ከሌለና አማራጭ ካልታጣ በስተቀር ሊገደቡ አይገባም፡፡ ያውም ሲገደቡ በተቻለ መጠን የመብት ክልከላው አነስተኛና ተመጣጣኝ መሆን አለበት፡፡ ይልቁንም ረቂቅ ሕጉ በቁጥር 156 ላይ በወንጀል የተከሰሰን ሰው ዋስትና መብት ከመንፈግ ይልቅ ተከሳሹ ከወንጀል ሕግ ቁጥር 134 እስከ 156 በተደነገገው መሠረት ተመሳሳይ የወንጀል ድርጊት ላለመፈጸም የእጅ ጠብቅ ዋስ እንዲያቀርብ፣ ከአንድ ቦታ ርቆ እንዳይሄድ ወይም ወደ አንዳንድ ቦታዎች ድርሽ እንዳይል መከልከል የሚቻልበትን ለአገራችን አዲስና የመጠቁ ሐሳቦችን ይዞና አስተዋውቆ እያለና ዳኞች እነኝህን አሠራሮችን መጠቀም ሲችሉ፣ በደፈናው እስከ ዕድሜ ልክና ሞት ድረስ በሚያስቀጣ ወንጀል የተከሰሱ ሰዎችን የዋስትና መብት በዳኞች እንዲወሰን ሥልጣኑን ለፍርድ ቤቶች ከመተው ይልቅ መብቱን በአዋጁ መግፈፉ ተመጣጣኝ ካለመሆኑም በላይ ሌሎች አማራቾችን ለመጠቀም አለመሞከሩን የሚያሳይ ነው፡፡ ተከሳሹ ይጠፋል ተብሎ የሚገመትበት ሁኔታ ካለ በእያንዳንዱ ጉዳይ የሚቀመጡት ዳኞች አመዛዝነው መወሰን (ዋስትናውን መንፈግ) እንደሚችሉ እየታወቀ፣ የዳኞችን ሥልጣን ቀምቶ በሕግ በጅምላ ዋስትና የመንፈግ አሠራር በእርግጥም አስፈላጊ ካልሆነና አማራጭ ካልጠፋ በስተቀር አግባብነት አይኖረውም፡፡ ፍርድ ቤቶቻችን ብዙ ችግር ቢኖርባቸውም አመኔታ ልንጥልባቸው ይገባል፡፡ ከዚህ አኳያ የፀረ ሽብር አዋጁም ሆነ የፀረ ሙስና አዋጆች እንደገና ሊፈተሹ ይገባል፡፡ እንዲሁም በሕገ መንግሥታዊው ሥርዓት፣ በመንግሥት መከላከያና ደኅንነት ላይ የሚፈጸሙትም ወንጀሎች ቢሆኑ በ1954 ዓ.ም. በወጣውና አሁን ሥራ ላይ ባለው ሕግ መሠረት የሰው ሕይወት ካልጠፋ በስተቀር በሕግ ዋስትና የማያስከለክሉ ወንጀሎች ሆነው እያሉ፣ በረቂቅ ሕጉ ግን የሰው ሕይወት ጠፋም አልጠፋም የተጠርጣሪዎቹ የዋስትና መብት በጅምላ መገፈፉ ሕጉን የሚያበለጽገው ሳይሆን ፍትሐዊነቱን የኋሊት የሚያስኬደው ነው፡፡
በጽሑፍ አቅራቢው እምነት የረቂቁ ሕግ ችግር በዚህ ብቻ አያበቃም፡፡ በረቂቁ ሕግ መሠረት ከከባድ ግድያ (በቀድሞ ሕግ ከግፍ አገዳደል ውጪ) በተራ ነፍስ ማጥፋት ግድያ የተከሰሱ ሰዎች ተጎጂው ቢሞትም እንኳን በዋስ ሊለቀቁ ነው፡፡ አሁን እየተሠራበት ባለው በ1954 ዓ.ም. የወንጀለኛ መቅጫ ሕግ ሥነ ሥርዓት መሠረት ግን በተራ ነፍስ ግድያ የተከሰሰ ሰው በዋስትና አይለቀቅም፡፡ ክቡር የሆነ የሰው ልጅ ሕይወት በቸልተኝነት ወይም ከአቅም በላይ በሆነ ምክንያት፣ ወይም በደም ፍላት ሳይሆን ሆነ ተብሎ በተፈፀመ ግድያ በተቀጠፈበትና ደም በፈሰሰበት ሁኔታ ገድሏል ተብሎ በበቂ ሁኔታ የተጠረጠረን ሰው ምንም እንኳን ተጠርጣሪው ንፁህ ቢሆንም በዋስ መልቀቅ ከአገራችን ተጨባጭ ሁኔታ አንፃር እጅግ በጣም ይከብዳል፡፡ ገዳዩ በዋስ ከተለቀቀ በኋላ የተሰወረ እንደሆነ በሟች ቤተሰቦችና በኅብረተሰቡ ላይ የሚደርሰው የሞራል ጉዳት ከፍተኛ ነው፡፡ በዚያ ላይ በብዙ አካባቢዎች ከዳበረው የደም መቃባትና ፍትሕን በራስ እጅ አስገብቶ ከመበቀል ባህላዊ ሕግና አሠራር አንፃር፣ ራሱ በዋስ የተለቀቀውን ተጠርጣሪና የተሰወረም እንደሆነ ንፁሃን ቤተሰቦቹን ለብቀላና ማለቂያ ለሌለው የደም መቃባት የሚዳርጋቸው ነው፡፡ ስለዚህ እንደ ጽሑፍ አቅራቢው እምነት ምናልባት በከባድ ቸልተኝነት ሰው በመግደል (እስከ 15 ዓመት በሚያስቀጣው) ወይም በደም ፍላት (በአልሞት ባይ ተጋዳይነት) ሰው በመግደል የተጠረጠሩ ሰዎች በዋስ ሊለቀቁ ከሚችሉ በስተቀር በተራ ነፍስ ግድያ የተጠረጠሩ ሰዎችን በዋስ እንዲለቀቁ መፍቀድ የከፋ አደጋና ጉዳት በኅብረተሰቡ ላይ ያስከትላል፡፡
በተራ ነፍስ ግድያና በከባድ ነፍስ ግድያ በሚገባ የተጠረጠሩ ሰዎችን በዋስ የመለቀቅ መብቱን በሕግ መገደብ ራሳቸው ተጠርጣሪዎቹን ከበቀል የሚታደግና ኅብረተሰቡንም ከደም መቃባት የሚጠበቅ በመሆኑ ተመጣጣኝነት ያለውና ሕገ መንግሥታዊ ነው፡፡
ሲጠቃለል ረቂቅ የወንጀል ሥነ ሥርዓት ሕጋችን አሁን እየተሠራበት ያለውን የ1954 ዓ.ም. ወንጀለኛ መቅጫ ሕግ ሥነ ሥርዓት ፈለግ በመከተልና እሱንም ትንሽ በማሻሻል በተራ ወይም በከባድ የነፍስ ግድያ ወይም በዘር ማጥፋትና በሌሎች ተመሳሳይ የጦር ወንጀለኝነት ብቻ የተከሰሱ ሰዎችን ያውም ተጎጂው የሞተ ወይም ይሞታል ተብሎ የሚጠበቅ ከሆነ ብቻ የዋስትና መብታቸው በሕግ ሊነፈግ ይገባል፡፡ ከዚህ ውጪ የሰው ሕይወት በጠፋባቸው ወይም ተጎጂው ይሞታል ተብሎ በሚጠበቅባቸውና ከ16 ዓመት በላይ በሚያስቀጡ ወንጀሎች ብቻ ዋስትና በሕግ ሊነፈግ ይገባል እንጂ ሕጉ የኋሊት ተጉዞ እስከ ዕድሜ ልክና ሞት ሊያስቀጣ በሚችልና ነገር ግን ከነፍሱ ግድያ ጋር ግንኙነት በሌለው ወንጀል የተከሰሱ ሰዎችን የዋስትና መብት ሁሉ በጅምላ (በደምሰሳው) በአዋጅ ሊገፍ አይገባም፡፡   

Which Dictator Killed The Most People?


Which Dictator Killed The Most People?


They say that it takes compassion for humanity, love for country and a strong pursuit of justice and mercy, to become a strong and respected leader of the masses. However, every once in a while, there are politicians or generals who decide to do things their own way. These cold-blooded dictators do not care for the value of life as much as they do for achieving their selfish motives of domination, power and immortality. The following infographic shows worldwide dictators ordered by the number of killings: 1 drop, 1 million dead. (Click the picture for a larger version)
Apparently, Hitler and Stalin combined killed less people that Mao Zedong…

dictatorship form of government offers for many advantages, for these benefits to translate into real life, a dictator needs to be selfless, benevolent, well experienced, and intelligent

Even though a dictatorship form of government offers for many advantages, for these benefits to translate into real life, a dictator needs to be selfless, benevolent, well experienced, and intelligent

What are the personality traits of a dictator?

The most common characteristic of a dictatorship: Hopelessness in the people — no hope of a free election to change leaders, no hope of fairness in court, no hope of a life lived with the freedom to speak your mind or challenge a bad idea.


What makes a ruler a dictator?

A dictator is a government leader who rules with unquestioned and unlimited power. Today, the term ” dictator ” is associated with cruel and oppressive rulers who violate human rights and maintain their power by jailing and executing their opponents

What are the bad things about dictatorship?

List of the Cons of a Dictatorship It is never a long-term solution to governing. In any given period of history, dictatorships tend to happen on the African continent more often than anywhere else. Opposition is rarely permitted. Under most dictatorships, opposition to the ruler or ruling party is rarely permitted. … Laws can be changed at any time. ..


What are the signs of a dictatorship?

Dictatorship refers to the misuses of political power. In the dictatorship characterized by the following symptoms such as press of mass media, abuse of human rights, embezzlement of public funds, un equity and misuse of constitution.

Is a good dictatorship better than a corrupt democracy?

yes honest dictator is better than corrupt democracy but then both have their plus and minus points, dictators have proved to be extremely ruthless, cruel, oppressing, and corrupt.

What are facts about dictatorship?

Facts About Dictatorship. 1. Dictatorship is a form of government in which a person or a group holds absolute power, unrestricted by laws, constitution or opposition. The term ‘dictator’ originated in the time of the Roman Republic .

What are the 3 types of dictatorships?


What are the 3 types of dictatorships?

Between the two world wars, three types of dictatorships have been described: constitutional, counterrevolutionary and fascist. Since World War II, a broader range of dictatorships has been recognized, including Third World dictatorships, theocratic or religious dictatorships and dynastic or family-based dictatorships.

Characteristics. Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized government power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential challengers. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime.

Dictatorships are often characterised by some of the following: suspension of elections and civil liberties; proclamation of a state of emergency; rule by decree; repression of political opponents; not abiding by the rule of law procedures, and cult of personality.

A young rickshaw operator in Jigjiga returns a cash of Birr 300,000 ($7,436) left in the rickshaw to the lucky owner. A mother was the owner of the money, she wanted to use the money to seek medical help for herself and a sick son (she sold some of her livestock to get the cash)


Essential Qualities of a Good Journalist


Essential Qualities of a Good Journalist
A Way with Words.

Thorough Knowledge. …

Investigative Skills. …

Effective Communication Skills. …

Professionalism and Confidence. …

Persistence and Discipline. …

Ethics are Important Too.

AWLO Media journalist Bekalu Alamiro, as far as I know, is a very loving, impartial and impartial journalist who fulfills these journalistic ethics. I would also like to say with all my heart that it is a very honest public ear and eye.

Why are you presenting to the people what the Ethiopian Defense Forces did to the people of Tigray? Why do you expose the crimes of the Defense Forces? Storm Media also responded to the decision by the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority.Why are you presenting to the people what the Ethiopian Defense Forces did to the people of Tigray? Why do you expose the crimes of the Defense Forces? Storm Media also responded to the decision by the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority.


Special envoy for the Horn of Africa to address political instability and conflict in the East African region, including a brewing civil war and humanitarian crisis in northern Ethiopia, current and former officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.


Special envoy for the Horn of Africa to address political instability and conflict in the East African region, including a brewing civil war and humanitarian crisis in northern Ethiopia, current and former officials familiar with the matter told Foreign Policy.

The new special envoy post could fill a diplomatic leadership gap in the administration’s foreign-policy ranks as it works to install other senior officials in the State Department, a process that could take weeks or even months to complete, as they require presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. Special envoy posts do not require Senate confirmation.
A new Horn of Africa envoy would have their work cut out for them: Sudan is undergoing a delicate political transition after three decades under a dictatorship, South Sudan is wracked by chronic instability and corruption, and the fragile government of Somalia is grappling with ongoing threats from the al-Shabab terrorist group and political gridlock that has delayed national elections. An ongoing dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over a major dam project adds another layer of complexity to the tensions in the region.
The most pressing crisis in the eyes of many U.S. policymakers, however, is in Ethiopia. In November 2020, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a military campaign against the ruling party in the country’s northern Tigray region, after accusing it of attacking a government military base. Conflict has ravaged the region since then, marked by thousands of deaths, millions in need of humanitarian assistance, and widespread reports of interethnic violence. U.S. officials fear that the conflict could turn into a full-blown regional crisis, with turmoil spilling over into neighboring Eritrea and Sudan.
While officials cautioned no final decision has yet been made, one top contender for the potential job is Donald Booth, a seasoned diplomatic troubleshooter in the region who currently serves as U.S. special envoy for Sudan and has previou

Biden Mulls Special Envoy for Horn of Africa

Authentic leadership theory emphasizes that leaders are free to adopt or develop their own leadership style


Authentic leadership theory emphasizes that leaders are free to adopt or develop their own leadership style so long as that style is consistent with their own character and values. Here are the four components of authentic leadership. Which do you possess?

1. Self-Awareness (“Know Thyself”)

2. Relational Transparency (“Be Genuine”)

3. Balanced Processing (“Be Fair-Minded”)

4. Internalized Moral Perspective (“Do the Right Thing”).

Ten Authentic Leadership Characteristics:
Self-awareness,  Lead with heart, Focus on long-term results, Integrity, Lead with vision, Listening skills, Transparency, Consistency, Share success with the team and Drawing on experience.”

Dr. Awol Kassim Allo: The cruelty of this government is boundless!


Very alarming reports that Ethiopian authorities have taken Bekele Gerba, who had been on a hunger strike for the last three weeks, to government hospital against his will and in violation of a court order. There are also reports that the authorities arrested and detained private doctors of the Oromo political leaders on hunger strike […]

Dr. Awol Kassim Allo: The cruelty of this government is boundless!

The genocidal campaign against the civil society of the people of Tigray has continued with the war and the plundering of the Tigreans’ property and the massacre of the Tigrayans. The oppression of the people and the rape of women, mothers in Tigray and so on. It is still happening. This is the angle of injustice in Tigray.


The genocidal campaign against the civil society of the people of Tigray has continued with the war and the plundering of the Tigreans’ property and the massacre of the Tigrayans. The oppression of the people and the rape of women, mothers in Tigray and so on. It is still happening. This is the angle of injustice in Tigray. What confuses me? Who can be held accountable for all this?   As a person, I am not a native of Tigray. I am not from Tigray by race or ethnicity. But instead of witnessing these atrocities against the people of Tigray, I wished to die.

በጋራ ገቢዎች ላይ ማብራሪያ ስለመስጠት ።Explaining common income.


በጋራ ገቢዎች ላይ ማብራሪያ ስለመስጠት ።
“””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””
የጋራ ገቢዎችን በተመለከተ ከምንሰጠው መረጃ በመነሳት የተለያዩ አስተያይቶች ሲሰጡ ተመልክተናል ። አንዳንዶቹ ደግሞ ከአስተያይት ተቆጥበው የፊዴሬሽን ም/ቤት የወሰነው የሚባለው የማከፋፈያ ቀመሩ ምንድን ነው የሚል ጥያቄ ያነሳሉ ። በመሆኑም የጋራ ገቢዎች የሚባሉት ምንድን ናቸው ? ማከፋፈያ ቀመሩ ምንድን ነው ? የሚሉትን መልስ መስጠትና ለህዝባችን ግልፅ ማድረግ ሃላፊነትና ግዴታችን በመሆኑ እንደሚከተለው ቀርቧል ። ጨርሰው አንብበው ይረዱ ለሌሎችም ያስረዱ ። በቀጣይ መታየት ያለበት ገንቢ አስተያየትም ካለ ለመቀበልና ለውሳኔ ሰጭ አካል ለማቅረብ ዝግጁ መሆናችንን በዚሁ አጋጣሚ ለመግለፅ እፈልጋለሁ ።

የጋራ ገቢ ማለት ፦ በኢ.ፊ.ዴ.ሪ ሕገ መንግስት አንቀፅ 98 መሠረት የፌዴራል መንግስትና የክልል መስተዳድሮች በጋራ እንዲጥሉና እንዲሰበስቡ ስልጣን ከተሰጣባቸው (concurrent power of taxation) የታክስ/ግብር ምንጮች እንዲሁም በአንቀፅ 99 መሠረት የፌዴራሽን ምክር ቤትና የህዝብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት በጋራ በመሆን በ2/3 ድምፅ የጋራ የታክስ ስልጣን መሆኑን (concurrent power of taxation) ከሚለያዋቸውን የታክስ/ግብር ምንጮች በፌዴራል መንግስት ተሰብስቦ የሚተላለፍ የክልሎች መብት የሆነ ገቢ ማለት ነው፡፡ ነገር ግን የጋራ ገቢ ማለት ፌዴራል መንግስት በህገ መንግስት አንቀፅ 62/7 መሠረት ለክልሎች የሚሰጥ ድጎማ አይደለም፡፡
በዚህም መሠረት የጋራ ገቢዎች የሚባሉት፡-

  1. የክልል መስተዳድሮችና የፌዴራል መንግስት በጋራ ከሚያቋቁሟቸው የልማት ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ የንግድ ሥራ ገቢ ግብርና የሥራ ገቢ ግብር፤

1.1 የንግድ ሥራ ገቢ ግብር፡-
የንግድ ሥራ ገቢ ግብር ማለት በፌዴራል ገቢ ግብር አዋጅ 979/2008 አንቀፅ 3 መሠረት የንግድ ሥራ ላይ ከተሰማሩ ታክስ ከፋዮች የሚሰበሰብ ግብር/ታክስ ማለት ነው፡፡ በዚህ ድንጋጌ መሠረት የንግድ ሥራ የሚባለው በተከታታይ ወይም ለአጭር ጊዜ ለትርፍ የሚከናወን ማንኛውም የኢንዱስትሪ፣ የንግድ፣ የሙያ ወይም ቮኬሽናል ሥራ ሲሆን ተቀጣሪ ለቀጣሪው የሚሠጠውን አግልግሎት ወይም ቤት ማከራየትን አይጨምርም፡፡ እንዲሁም በንግድ ሕግ መሠረት የንግድ ሥራ ነው ተብሎ እውቅና የተሰጠው ሌላ ማንኛውም ሥራ ወይም ህንፃ ማከራየትን ሳይጨምር የኩባንያው ዓላማ ምንም ቢሆን ማንኛውም የአክሲዮን ማህበር ወይም ኃላፊነቱ የተወሰነ የግል ማህበር የሚሠራው ማንኛውም ሥራ የንግድ ሥራ ይባላል፡፡

ስለሆነም የክልል መስተዳድሮችና የፌዴራል መንግስት በጋራ ከሚያቋቁሟቸው የልማት ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ የንግድ ሥራ ገቢ ግብር የጋራ ገቢ ነው፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት የነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም ቀመር መሠረት ክፍፍሉ የካፒታል መዋጮ ድርሻን መሰረት አድርጎ የነበረ ሲሆን አዲሱ ቀመር ግን 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ለክልል እንዲሆን ተደርጓል፡፡

1.2 የሥራ ግብር፡-
የሥራ ግብር ማለት ደግሞ ከመቀጠር የሚገኝ ገቢ ላይ በፌዴራል ገቢ ግብር አዋጅ 979/2008 በአንቀፅ 11 ምጣኔዎች መሠረት የሚጣልና የሚሰበሰብ ግብር ነው፡፡ ስለሆነም የክልል መስተዳድሮችና የፌዴራል መንግስት በጋራ ከሚያቋቁሟቸው የልማት ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ የሥራ ግብር የጋራ ገቢ ነው፡፡ ስለሆነም ክፍፍሉ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት የነበረው የ1989 ማከፋፈያ ቀመር መሠረት 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ለክልል ሲሆን በአዲሱ ቀመር ግን 100% ለክልል እንዲሆን ተደርጓል፡፡

1.3 የሽያጭ ታክስ (የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና ተርንኦቨር ታክስ)፡-
የሽያጭ ታክስ በተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና በተርንኦቨር ታክስ የተተካ ሲሆን የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስ ማለት በተጨማሪ ታክስ አዋጅ ቁ. 285/2002 እንዲሁም የተርኦቨር ታክስ ማለት ደግሞ በተርንኦቨር ታክስ አዋጅ ቁ. 308/2002 መሠረት ታክስ ከሚከፈልባቸው ግብይቶች የሚሰበሰቡ ታክሶች ናቸው፡፡ ስለሆነም የክልል መስተዳድሮችና የፌዴራል መንግስት በጋራ ከሚያቋቁሟቸው የልማት ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ የሽያጭ ታክስ (የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና ተርንኦቨር ታክስ) ገቢ የጋራ ገቢ ነው፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት በነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም ቀመር ክፍፍሉ 70% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 30% ለክልል ሲሆን በአዲሱ ቀመር ግን 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ደግም ለሁሉም ክልሎች የድጎማ ቀመርን መሠረት በማድረግ እንዲከፋፈል ተደርጓል፡፡

  1. ከግል ድርጅቶች ( ኩባንያዎች) የንግድ ሥራ ገቢ፣ ከባለ አክስዮኖች የትርፍ ድርሻ ገቢና የሽያጭ ታክስ ( የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና ተርንኦቨር ታክስ) የሚሰበሰብ ግብር/ታክስ፤

2.1 የንግድ ሥራ ገቢ ግብር፡-
የንግድ ሥራ ገቢ ግብር በተራ ቁጥር 01 የተሰጠውን ትርጉም የሚይዝ ሆኖ “ድርጅት” ማለት በፌዴራል ታክስ አስተዳደር አዋጅ ቁ. 983/2008 አንቀፅ 05 መሠረት ኩባንያ፣ የሽርክና ማህበርና ሌሎች ሲሆን ከግል ድርጅቶች (ኩባንያዎች) የሚሰበሰብ የንግድ ትርፍ ግብር የጋራ ገቢ ነው፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት በነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም ቀመር ክፍፍሉ 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ለክልል ሲሆን በአዲሱ ቀመር 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ገቢ ለመነጨበት ክልል ሆኖ ነገር ግን ድርጅቱ ከአንድ ክልል በላይ ሥራ ላይ ከተሰማራ 50%ቱ ገቢ ለመነጨባቸው ክልሎች ድርጅቱ በየክልሉ ለሠራተኞቹ ባወጣው ወጪ መሠረት እንዲሆን ተደርጓል፡፡

2.2 ከባለ አክስዮኖች የትርፍ ድርሻ ግብር፡-
በፌዴራል ገቢ ግብር አዋጅ ቁ. 979/2008 አንቀፅ 55/1ና2/ መሠረት በኢትዮጵያ ነዋሪ የሆነና ያልሆነ ሰው ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ባለው በቋሚነት በሚሠራ ድርጅት የትርፍ ድርሻ ያገኘ ሰው በጠቅላላው የትርፍ ድርሻ ገቢ ላይ 10% የትርፍ ድርሻ የገቢ ግብር የመክፈል ግዴታ አለበት፡፡ ስለሆነም ከባለ አክስዮኖች የትርፍ ድርሻ ገቢ የሚሰበሰብ የትርፍ ድርሻ ገቢ ግብር የጋራ ገቢ ነው፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት በነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም ቀመር ክፍፍሉ 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ለክልል ሲሆን በአዲሱ ቀመር 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ገቢ ለመነጨበት ክልል ሆኖ ነገር ግን ድርጅቱ ከአንድ ክልል በላይ ሥራ ላይ ከተሰማራ 50%ቱ ገቢ ለመነጨባቸው ክልሎች ድርጅቱ በየክልሉ ለሠራተኞቹ ባወጣው ወጪ መሠረት እንዲሆን ተደርጓል ፡፡

2.3 የሽያጭ ታክስ (የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና ተርንኦቨር ታክስ)፡-
የሽያጭ ታክስ በተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና በተርንኦቨር ታክስ የተተካ ሲሆን የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስ ማለት በተጨማሪ ታክስ አዋጅ ቁ. 285/2002 እንዲሁም የተርኦቨር ታክስ ማለት ደግሞ በተርንኦቨር ታክስ አዋጅ ቁ. 308/2002 መሠረት ታክስ ከሚከፈልባቸው ግብይቶች የሚሰበሰቡ ታክሶች ናቸው፡፡ ስለሆነም ከግል ድርጅቶች( ኩባንያዎች) የሽያጭ ታክስ (የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና ተርንኦቨር ታክስ) የሚሰበሰብ ገቢ የጋራ ገቢ ነው፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት በነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም ቀመር ክፍፍሉ 70% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 30% ለክልል ሲሆን በአዲሱ ቀመር ግን 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ለሁሉም ክልሎች የድጎማ ቀመርን መሠረት በማድረግ እንዲከፋፈል ተደርጓል፡፡

  1. ከግል ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ ኤክሳይዝ ታክስ፡-
    ከድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ ኤክሳይዝ ታክስ ማለት በኤክሳይዝ ታክስ አዋጅ ቁ. 1186/2020 መሠረት የተጣለው ታክስ ነው፡፡ ይህን ታክስ በተመለከተ ቀድሞ በሕግ መንግስቱ አንቀፅ 98 ተለይቶ ካልተቀጡ የታክስና ግብር የመጣል ስልጣኖችን መካከል ስለነበር የኢፌዴሪ የፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት በቁጥር 2-3/111/አ.21/12/1 በቀን 23/09/97 በፃፈው ደብዳቤ ሁለቱ (የፌዴሬሽንና የህዝብ ተወካዮች) ምክር ቤቶች በመስከረም 25/1996 ዓ/ም በጋራ ባደረጉ ስብሰባ የሕግ ሠውነት ተሰጥቷቸው ከተቋቋሙ የግል ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ ኤክሳይዝ ታክስ ገቢ የጋራ ገቢ እንዲሆን ተወስኗል፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት በነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም ቀመር ክፍፍሉ ያልተወሰነ ሲሆን በአዲሱ ቀመር ግን 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ለሁሉም ክልሎች የድጎማ ቀመርን መሠረት በማድረግ እንዲከፋፈል ተደርጓል፡፡
  2. ከድርጅቶች የፈጠራ መብትን በማከራየት የሚገኝ የሮያልቲ፡
    ይህንም ታክስ በተመለከተ ቀድሞ በህግ,ገ-መንግስቱ አንቀፅ 98 ተለይቶ ካልተቀጡ የታክስና ግብር የመጣል ስልጣኖችን መካከል ስለነበር የኢፌዴሪ የፌዴሬሽን ምክር ቤት በቁጥር 2-3/111/አ.21/12/1 በቀን 23/09/97 በፃፈው ደብዳቤ ሁለቱ (የፌዴሬሽንና የህዝብ ተወካዮች) ምክር ቤቶች በመስከረም 25/1996 ዓ/ም በጋራ ባደረጉ ስብሰባበተመሳሳይ መልኩ ከድርጅቶች የፈጠራ መብትን በማከራየት የሚገኝ የሮያልቲ ታክስ ገቢም የጋራ ገቢ እንዲሆን ተወስኗል፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት በነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም የሌለው ሲሆን በአዲሱ ቀመር 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ገቢ ለመነጨበት ክልል ሆኖ ነገር ግን ድርጅቱ ከአንድ ክልል በላይ ስራ ላይ ከተሰማራ 50%ቱ ገቢ ለመነጨባቸው ክልሎች ድርጅቱ በየክልሉ ለሠራተኞቹ ባወጣው ወጪ መሠረት እንዲሆን ተደርጓል፡፡
  3. ከፍተኛ የማዕድን፣ጋዝና ፔትሮሊየም ሥራዎች ከተሰማሩ ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ የማዕድን ሥራ ገቢ ግብርና የሽያጭ ታክስ (የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና ተርንኦቨር ታክስ)

5.1 የማዕድን ሥራ ገቢ ግብር፡-
የማዕድን ሥራ ገቢ ግብር ማለት በማዕድን ሥራዎች ገቢ ግብር አዋጅ መሠረት በከፍተኛ የማዕድን፣ ጋዝና ፔትሮሊየም ሥራዎች ላይ ከተሠማሩ ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ ገቢ ነው፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት የነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም ቀመር መሠረት ክፍፍሉ የካፒታል መዋጮ ድርሻን መሰረት አድርጎ የነበረ ሲሆን አዲሱ ቀመር ግን 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ለክልል እንዲሆን ተደርጓል፡፡

5.2 ከፍተኛ የማዕድን፣ጋዝና ፔትሮሊየም ሥራዎች ከተሰማሩ ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ የሽያጭ ታክስ (የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና ተርንኦቨር ታክስ)፡-
የሽያጭ ታክስ በተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና በተርንኦቨር ታክስ የተተካ ሲሆን የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስ ማለት በተጨማሪ ታክስ አዋጅ ቁ. 285/2002 እንዲሁም የተርኦቨር ታክስ ማለት ደግሞ በተርንኦቨር ታክስ አዋጅ ቁ. 308/2002 መሠረት ታክስ ከሚከፈልባቸው ግብይቶች የሚሰበሰቡ ታክሶች ናቸው፡፡ ስለሆነም በከፍተኛ የማዕድን፣ጋዝና ፔትሮሊየም ሥራዎች ከተሰማሩ ድርጅቶች የሚሰበሰብ የሽያጭ ታክስ (የተጨማሪ እሴት ታክስና ተርንኦቨር ታክስ) የሚሰበሰብ ገቢ የጋራ ገቢ ነው፡፡ ከአዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር በፊት በነበረው የ1989 ዓ.ም ቀመር ክፍፍሉ 70% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 30% ለክልል ሲሆን በአዲሱ ቀመር ግን 50% ለፌዴራል መንግስት 50% ለሁሉም ክልሎች የድጎማ ቀመርን መሠረት በማድረግ እንዲከፋፈል ተደርጓል፡፡

በአጠቃላይ ከላይ በተጠቀሰው አዲሱ የጋራ ገቢዎች ማከፋፈያ ቀመር ሥርዓት መሠረት ሚኒስቴር መ/ቤታችን በመጀመሪያው ግማሽ ዓመት ከንግድ ትርፍና ቀጥታ ካልሆኑ ታክሶች ሥርዓቱን ለመተግበር በዘረጋው ሲስተም (Revenue Sharing System) መሠረት ብር 11,991,401,706.11 የጋራ ገቢ የክልሎች ድርሻ ማከፋፈል ችሏል፡፡ ይህ አፈፃፀም ከ2012 በጀት ዓመት ተመሳሳይ ወቅት ለክልሎች ከተላለፈው የጋራ ገቢ ጋር ሲነፃፀር 8,681,102,030.61 ወይም 262% እድገት አለው፡፡

Explaining common income.
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Based on the information we provide about common income, we have seen different opinions. Some have questioned whether the House of Federation has decided on a distribution formula. So what are common income? What is the distribution formula? It is our responsibility and responsibility to respond and make it clear to our people. Read it and explain it to others. I would like to take this opportunity to express our readiness to accept any constructive comments that may be considered and to make a decision.

Joint Revenue: According to Article 98 of the FDRE Constitution, the Federal Government and State Governments are jointly authorized to collect and collect taxes (concurrent power of taxation) and in accordance with Article 99, the House of Federation and the House of Peoples’ Representatives. 3 Votes is the revenue of the states collected by the federal government from the tax sources that distinguish the concurrent power of taxation. However, common income does not mean that the federal government subsidizes states under Article 62/7.
Accordingly, common income
Business income tax and labor income tax collected from state governments and public enterprises jointly established by the federal government;
1.1 Business Income Tax
Business income tax is a tax that is collected from business taxpayers in accordance with Article 3 of the Federal Income Tax Proclamation 979/2008. According to this provision, business is any industrial, commercial, vocational or vocational work that is carried out on a regular or short-term basis, and does not include services provided or rented by the employer. Any work performed by any corporation or limited liability company, regardless of the purpose of the company, is considered business, except for the lease of any other work or building that is recognized as a business under commercial law.

Therefore, the business income tax collected by the state governments and the public enterprises established by the federal government is a common income. According to the 1989 formula, which preceded the new common income distribution formula, the distribution was based on the share of capital contributions, while the new formula was 50% for the federal government and 50% for the state.

1.2 Employment Tax
Labor tax is a tax that is levied and collected in accordance with Article 11 of the Federal Income Tax Proclamation 979/2008. Therefore, labor tax collected from state governments and joint ventures by the federal government is a common income. Accordingly, the division was 50% for the federal government, 50% for the state, and 100% for the state, according to the 1989 distribution formula, which preceded the new common income distribution formula.

1.3 Sales Tax (VAT and Turnover Tax) ፡
VAT is replaced by VAT and Turnover Tax. VAT means VAT Proclamation no. 285/2002 and Turnover Tax also means the Turnover Tax Proclamation no. 308/2002 are taxes levied on taxable transactions. Therefore, sales tax (VAT and Turnover Tax) collected from state governments and joint ventures by the federal government is a common income. Prior to the 1989 formula, the distribution was 70% to the federal government, 30% to the state, and 50% to the federal government, and 50% to the federal government, according to the subsidy formula for all states.

Taxes collected from business enterprises, shareholders’ profits and sales tax (VAT and Turnover Tax);
2.1 Business Income Tax
Business Income Tax shall be defined as No. 01, “Enterprise” in the Federal Tax Administration Proclamation no. According to Article 05 of 983/2008, a company, a partnership, etc., is a joint venture tax collected from private companies. According to the 1989 formula before the new common income distribution formula, 50% is for the federal government, 50% for the state, and 50% for the federal government, 50% for the state, but if the enterprise operates in more than one region, 50% of the state is in the region. It is based on the cost to the staff.

2.2 Tax Shares from Shareholders
Federal Income Tax Proclamation no. Pursuant to Articles 55 (1 and 2) of 979/2008, a person who is a resident of Ethiopia and who is not a resident of Ethiopia is liable to pay 10% dividend tax on his gross income. Therefore, the dividend income tax collected from shareholders is a common income. According to the 1989 formula before the new common income distribution formula, 50% is for the federal government, 50% for the state, and 50% for the federal government, 50% for the state, but if the enterprise operates in more than one region, 50% of the state is in the region. It is based on the cost to the staff.

2.3 Sales Tax (VAT and Turnover Tax) ፡
VAT is replaced by VAT and Turnover Tax. VAT means VAT Proclamation no. 285/2002 and Turnover Tax also means the Turnover Tax Proclamation no. 308/2002 are taxes levied on taxable transactions. Therefore, sales tax (value added tax and turnover tax) from private companies is a common income. In the 1989 formula, before the new common income distribution formula, 70% was distributed to the federal government, 30% to the state, and 50% to the federal government, and 50% to the federal government.

Excise tax collected from private companies
Excise tax collected from corporations is the excise tax proclamation no. 1186/2020 is the basis of the tax. In this letter, the House of Federation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) No. 2-3 / 111 / A21 / 12/1 dated 23/09/97 (the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples’ Representatives) dated 23/09/97, as it was one of the powers not subject to Article 98 of the Constitution. At a joint meeting on September 25, 2006, it was decided that the excise tax collected from legal entities should be a common income. The distribution was not limited to the 1989 formula, which preceded the new common income distribution formula, but in the new formula, 50% was distributed to the federal government and 50% to all states based on the subsidy formula.
Royalty Receipt from Leasing Creativity
In this regard, the House of Federation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) No. 2-3 / 111 / A21 / 12/1 dated 23/09/97 (the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples’ Representatives on 23/09/97) was among the powers that are not specified in Article 98 of the Constitution. In a joint meeting of the councils on September 25, 1996, it was also decided that the royalty tax on leasing patents from corporations should be shared. It did not exist in 1989, which preceded the new common income distribution formula. In the new formula, 50% of the revenue was generated by the federal government, but if the enterprise operates in more than one region, 50% of the revenue is allocated to the regions.
Mining Income Tax and Sales Tax (VAT and Turnover Tax) collected from large mining, gas and petroleum companies
5.1 Mining Income Tax
Mining Income Tax is a tax collected from companies engaged in major mining, gas and petroleum activities in accordance with the Mining Income Tax Proclamation. According to the 1989 formula, which preceded the new common income distribution formula, the distribution was based on the share of capital contributions, while the new formula was 50% for the federal government and 50% for the state.

5.2 Sales tax (VAT and Turnover Tax) collected from companies engaged in heavy mining, gas and petroleum operations
VAT is replaced by VAT and Turnover Tax. VAT means VAT Proclamation no. 285/2002 and Turnover Tax also means the Turnover Tax Proclamation no. 308/2002 are taxes levied on taxable transactions. Therefore, sales tax (value added tax and turnover tax) collected from large mining, gas and petroleum companies is a common income. In the 1989 formula, before the new common income distribution formula, 70% was distributed to the federal government, 30% to the state, and 50% to the federal government, and 50% to the federal government.

In general, according to the new common revenue distribution formula mentioned above, our Ministry has been able to distribute Birr 11,991,401,706.11 in the first half of the budget year under the Revenue Sharing System. This performance has increased by 8,681,102,030.61 or 262% compared to the same period in 2012/13.

The smear campaign against our organization and its leaders is a futile attempt to prevent the face of Amhara politics! – Tahir Mohamed


Ethio News – ኢትዮ ኒውስ

በድርጅታችንና አመራሮቹ ላይ የሚደረገው የስም ማጠልሸት ዘመቻ የአማራ ፖለቲካ ፊት እንዳይመጣ የሚደረግ ከንቱ ሙከራ ነው! – ጣሂር ሞሃመድ

Rakkoon Mana Marii Dhimmoota Islaamummaa Itoophiyaa Keessa Jiru Maal?


Mul’anni Dhaabbata waaraa ijaaruu namoota aangoo irra jiraniin gufateera Ustaaz Ahmaddin Jabal irraa Rakkoolee bakka hundaa Muslimoota mudatuufi kan akka biyyaatti uumamuuf furmaata barbaacha walii isaaniitii, ummataafi mootummaa wajjin ni mari’atu jettee osoo eegduu “akkamiin waa’ee filannoo kana ummata dagachiifnee filannoon maleetti hogganaa majlisaa taanee bakkicha irra turra?” Jechuu irraa ka’uudhaan ummata qoodaafi rakkoo uumaa […]

Rakkoon Mana Marii Dhimmoota Islaamummaa Itoophiyaa Keessa Jiru Maal?

Manni marii olaanaa Dhimmoota Islaamummaa Magaalaa Jimmaa yaa’ii Idilee 2ffaa geggeesse


Manni marii olaanaa Dhimmoota Islaamummaa Magaalaa Jimmaa bakka keessummoonni adda addaa argamanitti yaa’ii Idilee 2ffaa geggeessaa ture milkiin xumure. Yaa’iin kun ganama Sabtii kaleessaa Qur’aanaa fi du’aa’ii ulamootaatiin eega jalqabamee booda, dura ta’aan Majlisa Magaalaa Jimmaa Sheikh Muhammadamiin Tamaam haasaya baniinsaafi keessummoota yaa’icha irratti argaman anaa dhufu jechuun simatanii jiru. Yaa’ii kana irrattii gaabsni raawwii […]

Manni marii olaanaa Dhimmoota Islaamummaa Magaalaa Jimmaa yaa’ii Idilee 2ffaa geggeesse

ጉዳዩ:- የኢትዮጵያን ኅልውና አደጋ ላይ የጣሉት ጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር አብይ አህመድ ስልጣናቸዉን ይልቀቁ!!


Gudii FAANA BUUTOTA #GOOBANAA ጉዳዩ:- የኢትዮጵያን ኅልውና አደጋ ላይ የጣሉት ጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር አብይ አህመድ ስልጣናቸዉን ይልቀቁ!! ጥር 19 ቀን 2013 ዓ.ም
➢ ለኢፌድሪ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር ጽ/ቤት – አዲስ አበባ
➢ ለኢፌዴሪ የውጭ ጉዳይ ሚኒስቴር – አዲስ አበባ
➢ለምርጫ ቦርድ (አዲስ አበባ
➢ለፍትህ ሚኒስቴር (አዲስ አበባ)
➢በኢፌዴሪ ፓርላማ ለህዝብ ተወካዮች (አዲስ አበባ)
➢ በዋሽንግተን ዲሲ የኢትዮጵያ ኤምባሲ-ዋሽንግተን ዲሲ

➢ ለሕብር ሬዲዮን ጣቢያ-ሰሜን […]

ጉዳዩ:- የኢትዮጵያን ኅልውና አደጋ ላይ የጣሉት ጠቅላይ ሚኒስቴር አብይ አህመድ ስልጣናቸዉን ይልቀቁ!!

Ethiopia re-enters the abyss of war – Ethiopia Insight


2021

by Kjetil Tronvoll



Last time Ethiopia descended into conflict, it took 17 years to emerge. Will Ethiopia’s new leaders learn from history?

The Ethiopian federal government’s “law enforcement operation” in Tigray aimed to capture the rebellious rulers in the northern regional state. Thus far, however, the core leadership is at large, and the campaign has further exposed the country’s political fragility, pushing it into the abyss of a likely long-term war.
Reports of military recruitment and reinforcements sent to the northern front to battle the rebels are again heard in Ethiopia, reminiscent of the recurring news headlines of the 1970s and 80s.
With the Tigray war now in its third month, the contours of how a drawn-out conflict may evolve are emerging.
Meanwhile, elsewhere in Ethiopia, other armed insurgencies are evolving. As conflict lines deepen, pressure increases on the state’s security forces and capacity. The surge in violence worsens the dire humanitarian situation across the country, weakens the economy, and diverts government attention, resources, and funding from economic development to warring.
The Tigray war will therefore impact politics, social cohesion, and development all over the country, just like the 1974-1991 Tigrayan struggle.
The military campaign on Tigray will be remembered as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s “crossing the Rubicon” moment. No matter the outcome, or how long it will take to reach a victory or settlement, Ethiopia will likely never return to the status quo ante.

Steps to war

 This war has been long in the making.
For years, the cohesion within the ruling government coalition of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has withered, accentuated by the widespread disturbances during 2015-2018 instigated by the Qeerroo (Oromo) followed by the Fano (Amhara), youth protest movements.
The youth protested against government abuse and maladministration, as well as TPLF dominance within the EPRDF. The Qeerroo demanded an ‘Oromo First’ policy, that the Oromo should exercise self-rule in Oromia and be the dominating force at the federal level, due to their demographic size.
The internal power-struggle culminated with the ascent of Abiy to the helm in April 2018. Representing the Oromo faction of the coalition with the support of the Amhara party, Abiy’s rise undercut the longstanding Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominance of the EPRDF.
In December 2019, initial tensions between the factions of Abiy’s EPRDF morphed to open hostility when he dissolved the coalition and crafted the Prosperity Party from its ashes.
The TPLF leadership declared the dissolving of the EPRDF as illegal and regrouped in Tigray, where they started to design their own development policies and political visions of a Tigray “de facto state” with a looser relationship with the federal government. Subsequent attempts by, inter alia, religious leaders to pacify the increasing tensions failed.
The decisive breach of relations between the federal government and Tigray’s rulers began with Addis Ababa’s decision to postpone the 2020 general elections due to the pandemic. TPLF, believing it was because Abiy feared losing at the polls, characterized the postponement beyond government term limits unconstitutional.



Can Tigray’s election serve as a beacon of Ethiopian democracy?

By Abreha Gebrearegawi Hagos

The TPLF decided to proceed with elections in Tigray, which the federal government condemned as unconstitutional. Addis warned of sanctions and possible intervention if the regional poll went ahead. Tigray did not budge, however.
During the 9 September elections, in my interviews with dozens of people from across the region, it was clear that for them, this was not an ‘ordinary election,’ but a referendum on their security and self-determination. In this respect, it was a plebiscite on TPLF’s role as the protector of Tigrayan people and the spirit of woyane (Tigrinya for ‘rebellion’)—the resistance against centralized rule and outsized outside influence on Tigray.
Even local opposition members threw their support to the TPLF. One told me: “As the situation is, even I will vote for the TPLF. They are the only one who can offer us protection against the threats from the federal government. The way PM Abiy Ahmed has handled the issue has paradoxically made him the best campaign manager TPLF could have imagined.”
In the aftermath of a TPLF landslide win, both governments denounced each other as unconstitutional, leading to the formal breach of political relations. From there, it was just a matter of time before the political conflict would explode into armed confrontation.

Three-fronted offensive

 In mid-October, contacts in Amhara and Tigray observed deployment of federal and Amhara special forces on the southern and western borders of Tigray, apparently preparing to attack Tigray. The Amhara police commissioner later confirmed that federal and Amhara forces had planned the attack, but needed time to build sufficient military capacity to tackle the considerable Tigrayan security forces. Likewise, Sudanese military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan recently confirmed that Abiy notified Khartoum in advance of the attack, asking Sudan to help “prevent any infiltration to add from Sudan by the TPLF fighters.”
But Tigray would attack first.
On the eve of 3 November, Tigray security forces, in cooperation with Tigrayan federal military officers, carried out what they called a “pre-emptive” strike against the Northern Command of the federal army in Tigray. Tigray’s leaders claimed it was a legitimate exercise of self-defense against advancing enemy forces. Abiy’s government, however, considered it treason.
Almost immediately, the ENDF and its allies launched a massive, three-pronged offensive against Tigray. Tens of thousands of federal troops, supplemented by Amhara militia and regional special forces, attacked Tigray’s west and south, while the Eritrean military swept in from the north. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian air force bombarded Tigrayan positions and cities.
On the western frontline of the area known as Welkait, Amhara forces, backed by ENDF mechanized brigades, made rapid advances across the difficult-to-defend flat, lowland terrain. TPLF military sources, as well as civilians and staff in Amhara region hospitals treating injured troops, told me that the attackers used an overwhelming “human wave” tactic, where hundreds of troops rushed head-on towards entrenched TDF positions, forcing Tigrayan forces to retreat to higher elevations.
The fighting on the southern frontline of Raya proved to be a tougher challenge for the ENDF, as the escarpment provided better terrain for defensive positions. After assuming control of the lowlands, federal forces were soon bogged down in intense fighting when trying to advance into the Tigrayan highlands, leading to more mass fatalities.
The third and perhaps most decisive front was to the north. Eritrea supported the Ethiopian offensive from day one by assisting the federal troops who fled the Tigrayan assault on the Northern Command, and by shelling the city of Humera on the western front. Soon, however, Asmara turned its military complex against its longtime foes.



The causes and course of the Tigray conflict, according to Abiy Ahmed

By Negash Haile

Eritrean troops, together with Northern Command units, battled the TDF at several points along the Eritrea-Tigray border. In the second week of November, Eritreans living in the border city of Senafe told me Eritrean forces were fighting TDF. Increasing evidence from international sources confirmed the Eritrean involvement, although Abiy has repeatedly denied this. Yet even his own military leadership later confirmed Eritrean participation.
Tigray’s leaders claimed Eritreans also lost countless soldiers, but the onslaught and heavy shelling of cities forced Tigrayan forces to retreat from the urban areas along the main road towards Mekelle and mountainous central Tigray.
Initially, Abiy believed the operation would be completed in a short time with the arrest of the top leadership. Still, it took three weeks of intense fighting, with likely thousands, if not tens of thousands, of fatalities, before the allied forces reached the outskirts of Mekelle, Tigray’s capital.
In order to spare its destruction and heavy civilian losses, Tigray’s leadership left the city for the mountains together with their troops and other elites, allowing the ENDF to enter on 28 November when Abiy declared “mission accomplished.”

Mission far from accomplished

 At that point, Abiy would make the world believe that everything was back to normal.
An ‘interim government of Tigray’ of handpicked representatives was established and Abiy, asserted, ludicrously, that not a single civilian died in the capture of Tigray’s cities. The reality could not be more different: There have been mass atrocities against civilian and the war continues.
Abiy has yet to achieve one of the publicly stated goals of the offensive: neutralizing the TPLF leadership to bring the whole Tigray region back under Addis Ababa’s sway. To be sure, Abiy has scored significant victories: his forces have captured prominent TPLF leaders, including Sebhat Nega, Abraham Tekeste and others, and killed founding members Seyoum Mesfin and Abay Tsehaye.
But most of the executive political and military leadership, including chairperson Debretsion Gebremichael, spokesperson Getachew Reda and the top military leaders, such as Tadesse Wereda and Tsadkan Gebretensae, is still at large. In a stark indicator of the ongoing struggle for territorial control and popular support, federal authorities have offered over a quarter million dollars for any information which could lead to their capture.
Above all, the violence has not stopped.
The TDF appear to be standing their ground in central Tigray, with TPLF-aligned media reporting targeted attacks on the enemy. There are recent reports of clashes around Mekelle, particularly along its supply routes, against Eritrean forces in the northern part of the region, as well as on the western front around Dansha. The UN said that by 19 January, “active hostilities” continued across almost all of the region.
So, it seems Tigray’s leaders preparing for a long-term campaign. In early January, the ‘Tigray Regional Government” vowed that its “struggle will continue until the enemies of people of Tigray are completely made to leave Tigray.”
While a worsening humanitarian situation and blocked supply routes may inhibit an effective resistance, the TPLF may instead still enjoy the upper hand in terms of the hearts and minds of Tigray’s population. There have been many recent reports of youth leaving urban areas to join the resistance, particularly after atrocities have been committed.

“Tigray today is a living hell”

Information about widespread assault, rape, and killings of civilians all over Tigray are mounting from media and social media stories, human rights researchers, interviews with local people and refugees, and satellite image analysis.
An Ethiopian contact with years of experience as a human-rights monitor across Africa recently told me after escaping Mekelle: “I have seen the devastating effects of war and atrocities in many countries, but never had I thought this would happen to us. Tigray today is a living hell.” Like many, he requested anonymity. Such is the level of fear in Abiy’s Ethiopia.
Several hundred people were brutally killed in Maikadra around 9 November during the offensive in western Tigray. The government-appointed Ethiopian Human Rights Commission blamed it on Tigrayan forces, but witness accounts have been mixed. Those who fled Maikadra to Sudan said Amhara forces were culpable. As with the entire conflict, an independent investigation is needed.
While it appears to have been a horrific example of tit-for-tat ethnic killing, the Maikadra incident was used to rally support for revenge by Amhara nationalists, and reinforced Amhara support for the war.
There is little doubt that widespread and systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity are being perpetrated against the civilian population. Particularly gruesome atrocities are attributed to Eritrean forces and the Amhara militia, as in witness testimonies from refugees who tell of killings, rape, and torture.
Both the UN special advisors on the ‘Prevention of Genocide’ and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ warned about the escalating ethnic tensions and profiling in the country. The EU has done the same several times.



Hawks and doves: The great divide over the war in Tigray

By Fassil Hailu

In November, Genocide Watch, a reputed international NGO, classified the situation as the “extermination phase” in the stages of genocide. “Extermination” is followed only by “denial,” which seems to correspond with the current position of the Ethiopian government which rejects any allegations of wrongdoing in Tigray. An independent tribunal will be needed to determine whether genocide occurred.
The war has also contributed to the worst humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia since the biblical 1984 famine.
Even the interim administration admits that people are dying of starvation. In a humanitarian assistance meeting on 8 January, between UN agencies, international NGOs and regional and federal authorities, the PP-appointed administrator of the Central Zone of Tigray stated: “if urgent emergency assistance is not mobilized, hundreds of thousands might starve to death.”
In a January report, the interim government estimated the conflict has displaced 2.2 million people, half from western Tigray. They may be now mostly in TPLF-controlled central areas. Close to 60,000 more Tigrayans have fled to neighboring Sudan as refugee.  That number may have been considerably higher, but the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces blocked the border, preventing refugees to cross to safety.
The regional healthcare system has been destroyed. Hospital, clinics, ambulances have been looted. Basic services across Tigray are extremely precarious. The interim government estimates that about 4.5 million Tigrayans, out of a population of about six million, will depend on humanitarian assistance in 2021.
Although the Ethiopian government agreed with the UN in early December to allow “unimpeded humanitarian access” to Tigray, this has not happened, which led to the EU aid cut. The top EU diplomat Josef Borrell also cited “reports of ethnic-targeted violence, killings, massive looting, rapes, forceful returns of refugees and possible war crimes.”
While the EU is preparing to dispatch the Finnish foreign minister to push for unfettered humanitarian access to Tigray, it appears so far that Addis Ababa is not willing to budge. This may be out of fear that free access will expose the political resistance against the intervention, the atrocities committed against civilians, and the full involvement of Eritrea.

 Regional conflagration

The international dimensions of the conflict were present from day one with Eritrea’s involvement. The Eritrean army allegedly controls and administers several Tigrayan towns in the northern part of the region, with fresh reinforcements reportedly deployed earlier this month.
It seems that the Eritrean army’s involvement was part of a plan hatched by Abiy with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, and is thus not considered a belligerent force to Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian federal government has not even acknowledged that there are any Eritrean forces on Ethiopian soil. However, the head of ENDF’s Northern Command, Major-General Belay Seyoum, described the Eritrean deployment as “an unwanted foreign force [which] entered into our territory….by itself.”
Representatives of the interim government of Tigray also claim that the Eritrean forces were not invited to take part in the war and are asked to pull out.
It thus rests with the UN Security Council to determine whether Eritrea is acting outside of international law in Tigray. But the internationalization of the war is not limited to Eritrea. It is still unfolding.
Belligerent rhetoric between Sudan and Ethiopia increases near-daily, threatening to erupt into yet another war. The row stems in part from the territorial dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia in the al-Fashga triangle. Continued pushing by Amhara nationalists claiming territorial ownership of the triangle, may compel Khartoum to take a more active stand on the Tigray war, as it seeks to preoccupy ENDF.
The TPLF has allies in Kassala in Eastern Sudan, as well as old friends in Khartoum, who may find it opportune to help them with supply routes in order to hit back on Addis Ababa’s stand on al-Fashqa. (It would also be a throwback to Sudan’s TPLF-friendly policies in the 80s and 90s when the Derg controlled Ethiopia.)
The chilly reception given to Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok during a recent visit to Addis Ababa, as well as a statement by al-Burhan, indicate that any goodwill gathered by Abiy in the early phase of his tenure is now spent political capital.



The war on Tigray: A multi-pronged assault driven by genocidal undercurrents 

By Gebrekirstos Gebremeskel

The other major regional player is Egypt, which has long sought to pressure Addis Ababa over the use of Nile waters.
The Arab nation already backs Sudan against Ethiopia on the Nile issue. While Cairo had long used Asmara as a proxy to pressure Addis, now that Isaias and Abiy are in cahoots, Egypt may shift its support to the TPLF to divert Ethiopia’s attention from finishing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The TPLF leadership may look differently at the GERD as a consequence of the war, and the prospects of Tigray possibly seeking secession from Ethiopia.
History aside, Sudanese and Egyptian support for the TPLF would be a game-changer. Such foreign backing could secure the Tigrayan forces with a steady source of supplies, safe havens for exiled leaders, and transit points for travel in and out of TDF-controlled areas. This explains the current TDF offensive on the western fronts in Tigray, as informed by interlocutors close to TDF, in order for the Tigrayan forces to create a corridor to the Sudanese border.
Elsewhere, armed groups in South Sudan and Somalia—both mired in conflicts of their own—may also see opportunities in Ethiopia’s quagmire. The Somali federal government has recently been questioned about the possible involvement of 3,000 Somali troops in the war on Tigray, of which 2,800 reportedly have been killed. Both Somalia and Ethiopia reject such claims, however.
Amid this worrying situation, Abiy has rejected all international offers to mediate the conflict. While Tigray’s leaders welcomed such initiatives, Abiy has made it clear to all envoys that he will not negotiate with the so-called “junta.”
IGAD and the AU, the two multilateral organizations with the authority to mitigate conflict in the region, seem paralyzed. Ethiopia and Abiy dominate IGAD, while the AU—headquartered in Addis Ababa—has long been under the sway of the Ethiopian authorities.

Diplomatic denials

So far it seems only the EU is willing and capable of taking a principled stand on the crisis, issuing repeatedly stern statements and, as noted, suspending 88 million Euros of budget support.
The UN system has, with some few exceptions, played a pusillanimous role.
Most of their in-country agencies offices are not willing or able to influence the dire political and humanitarian situation in Tigray. At the same time, UN sources tell me that Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, weak at best and a craven Abiy apologist at worst, tries to keep the emergency at arm’s length.
Many of the bilateral diplomatic missions to Ethiopia have likewise so far turned a blind eye to the crisis and kept quiet, or issued general statements of concern for the humanitarian situation without criticizing the Ethiopian government for blocking relief.
Over three decades of working in the Horn, I have seldom seen so much diplomatic positioning to claim “plausible deniability” regarding apparent atrocities.



The ‘peace’ that delivered total war against Tigray

By Yosief Ghebrehiwet

One wild card in the international scene is a re-energized US.
After stumbling in its regional diplomacy over the GERD negotiations, Washington has played only a minor role in the international discourse on the conflict. The little it did say was in support of Abiy.
Washington stood with the Prime Minister in the initial phase of the military campaign.
Ambassador Tibor Nagy, Trump’s top diplomat to Africa, blamed the TPLF for seeking to internationalize the conflict by launching rockets at Asmara—even praising Eritrea’s regime for its “restraint” as it marauded across northern Tigray.
However, the Biden administration is expected to change course. Incoming Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed concern about the level of violence and lack of humanitarian access to Tigray. Blinken may even appoint a special envoy to the region to push to pacify the conflict and secure political accountability. A more assertive US engagement may enable the UN Security Council, which so far has been quiescent, to take an active stand.

Into the Abyss again

In December 2019, Abiy declared, “war is the epitome of hell for all involved. I know because I have been there and back.” He was in Oslo at the time, delivering his Nobel Peace Prize lecture, ironically titled ‘Forging a Durable Peace in the Horn of Africa.’ Yet Ethiopia is once again sliding into the abyss of war—under the Nobel laureate’s watch.
What can be predicted about the future? Will we see the end of the war with the establishment of an interim government in Tigray, or the beginning of a protracted phase of the conflict?
So far, the Abiy-appointed interim administration is a shell: unable to provide basic services, much less to protect the current population from widespread atrocities and an unfolding humanitarian disaster.
It doesn’t even control much of Tigray’s territory. Besides the TPLF-held areas, Eritrean forces watch over the region’s north, while Amhara elements are annexing parts of western Tigray to form two new administrative zones.
Even if the interim government were more empowered, it is unlikely to gain much support because the Prosperity Party, which dominates the new administration, offers little salvation to Tigray’s people.
The ruling party has no organic constituency in Tigray, and prior to the ENDF capture of Mekelle, had no track record in the region, nor local representation. Its few Tigrayan members before the war all lived in Addis Ababa. Although new members have joined Tigray PP after the appointment of the interim government, it is challenging to identify a genuine Tigray PP constituency—although the banning of TPLF and likely prohibition of other Tigrayan nationalist parties will pave the way for PP gains in the region, should an election occur later this year.



Eritreans caught in dilemma over Tigray conflict

By Mebrahtu Ateweberhan

Instead, the Tigrayans I’ve spoken to, who include TPLF members, supporters of Tigrayan opposition parties, and others, generally perceive the PP to be arguing for a re-centralization of power to Addis Ababa at the cost of regional autonomy.
Yet the fiercely independent people of Tigray are strong defenders of the right to self-determination. They fear the re-imposition of a strained singular ‘Ethiopian identity,’ which would dilute the cultural and ethno-political rights enshrined in the constitution for themselves and others.
The majority of the Tigray population is thus likely to perceive the interim government as a Quisling regime, and consequently, it is likely that the TPLF will have a solid support-base in the region to wage a long-term insurgency. This is also what the TPLF is now communicating to its constituency—to prepare the people once again for the hardships and sacrifices of war.
In the aftermath of the killings of founding members in mid-January, the “National Government of Tigray” issued a statement that invoked atrocities committed against Tigrayan people, and exhorted the region’s youth to “pursue the invading enemy…inflict vengeance upon them, and show that Tigray remains to be the cemetery of invaders.”
Such fiery words should not merely be interpreted as the propaganda of rebels on the run.
After the news about the arrests and killings were known, a Tigrayan scholar long critical of TPLF, explained to me: “This may in short-term affect the morale of the Tigrayan people, but ultimately it will just add on the anger and resolve to stand together and fight. Anyone who has been in doubt, will now be certain about the intentions of the Abiy regime.”
With this in mind, Abiy’s battlefield victories may prove pyrrhic.
The history of the region, people’s resolve, and the political context of the country, all suggest that the Tigrayans once again will take up arms to defend their security and self-determination. The conflict is not perceived as a law-enforcement operation against TPLF; it is understood and experienced as a war of annihilation against Tigray.
There is thus no other option, many believe, than to fight—’woyane’.

Wither Ethiopia

If the conflict in Tigray continues for years, the only certain thing is that a different Ethiopia will emerge. The Tigray population, of which the absolute majority before the war identified as Ethiopians and wanted to remain under the federation, today have lost hope of living in peace with Ethiopia.
One veteran fighter from the 17-year’ war, who became a TPLF dissenter and served for almost three decades as a federal civil servant, told me: “We have crossed the point of no-return. We are now in a situation where we either are exterminated, or we fight. It has increased our determination and awakened us that we will never continue to be part of this empire.”
It seems that the majority of Tigrayans have given up hope of living in peace with the rest of Ethiopia, and they feel betrayed that few other Ethiopians have shown any solidarity or sympathy with the civilian victims of the massive atrocities taking place. Hence, many see secession to create an independent Tigray as solace for their collective grievances.



The secret war in Tigray

By Mistir Sew

It may not be too late, however, to reach a negotiated settlement that maintains Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. That would most likely involve a re-configuration of the federation into a so-called ‘loose federation’ or a confederate mode This solution may also be supported by the Oromo fronts and other multinational federalist parties in the country.
But, first, the fighting must stop.
I fear that this will only happen when the adversaries are sufficiently weakened on the battlefield, with the tragic loss of lives that entails. The last time, it took 17 years and hundreds of thousands killed before negotiations started a month prior to the collapse of the Derg military junta.
Let’s hope that Abiy may learn from the country’s war-torn history to understand that this political dispute cannot be solved by arms, and open up for negotiations before it is too late.

https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/01/29/ethiopia-re-enters-the-abyss-of-war/

የፌዴራል ከፍተኛ ፍርድ ቤት 6ኛ አገራዊ የምርጫ ጉዳይ አለመግባባቶችን የሚመለከት አስር ባላሦስት ዳኞች የሚሰየሙበት አስር/10/ ችሎቶችን /30 ዳኞችን/ በልደታ ምድብ ፍትሃብሔር ምድብ ችሎት አደራጅቷል፡


የፌዴራል ከፍተኛ ፍርድ ቤት 6ኛ አገራዊ የምርጫ ጉዳይ አለመግባባቶችን የሚመለከት አስር ባላሦስት ዳኞች የሚሰየሙበት አስር/10/ ችሎቶችን /30 ዳኞችን/ በልደታ ምድብ ፍትሃብሔር ምድብ ችሎት አደራጅቷል፡

የፌዴራል ከፍተኛ ፍርድ ቤት በኢትዮጵያ አገራችን ጊዜ ለሚካሄደው አገራዊ ምርጫ የወጣውን የጊዜ የድርጊት መርሐ ግብር መሠረት በማድረግና የጊዜን ወሳኝነት /Time is of an essence/ ግንዛቤ ውስጥ በማስገባት ከምርጫ ጋር ተያይዞ የሚነሱ አለመግባባቶችን ፈጣን፣ ቀልጣፋ፣ ተደራሽ፣ ውጤታማ የሆነ የዳኝነት አገልግሎት ነጻ፣ ገለልተኛ፣ ፍትሐዊና ህጋዊ በሆነ መልኩ ለመስጠት ከወዲሁ ዝግጅት እያደረገ ይገኛል፡፡

በምርጫ ምክንያት የሚነሱ አለመግባባቶች ላይ በተለይም በቦርዱ በሚሰጡ ውሳኔዎች ላይ የሚቀርቡ አቤቱታዎችን በግልጽነትና በተጠያቂነት ለማየት ጉዳዮቹን በአንድ ዳኛ ከማያት ይልቅ ሦስት ዳኞች በተሰየሙበት ችሎት መታየት የተሻለ በመሆኑ ይህ እንዲሆን ስለሚቻልበት ሁኔታ ቀደም ሲል ለዳኞች አስተዳደር ጉባኤ በሦስት እንዲታይ እንድወሰን የቀረበውን የውሳኔ ሃሳብ በዳኞች አስተዳደር ጉባዔ ተቀባይነት በማግኛቱ ነው፡፡

በሌላ በኩል ለሁሉም ፍርድ ቤቱ ዳኞች የአቅም ግንባታ በፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች ምዝገባ እና የምርጫ ሥነ-ምግባር አዋጅ ቁጥር 1162/2011 እና የብሔራዊ ምርጫ ቦርድ ማቋቋሚ አዋጅ 1133/2011 ላይ የግንዛቤ ማስጨበጫ ስልጠናዎች እንዲሰጡ ተደርጓል፡፡

በመሆኑም በምርጫ ቦርድ በወጣው የጊዜ ሰሌዳ የድርጊት መርሃ ግብር ባገናዘበ ሁኔታ ፈጣን፣ ውጤታማ፣ ነጻ፣ ገለልተኛ፣ ፍትሐዊና ህጋዊ የዳኝነት አገልግሎት ለመስጠት ዝግጁ መሆኑን እየገለፀ ከዚሁ ጋር ተያይዞ በሚቀርቡ ክርክሮች ላይ ተገቢውን ፍትህ መስጠት ይቻል ዘንድ የሚመለከታቸው አካላት በተለይም ተከራካሪ ሆነው የሚቀርቡ አካላት ከወዲሁ በቀናነትና በቅን ልቦነ እና በትጋት በመከራከር የበኩላቸውን አስተዋጽኦ ማበርከት እንዲችሉ ፍርድ ቤቱ ጥሪውን ያስተላልፋል፡፡

ፍርድ ቤቱ በምርጫ ምክንያት የሚነሱ አለመግባባቶችን የተፋጠነ የዳኝነት አገልግሎት ለመስጠት በተደራጁ ችሎቶች ለተመደቡ ዳኞች አገልግሎት የሚውል የተለያዩ ሰነዶች ማለትም ጉዳዩን የሚያስተዳድሩበትን አጀንዳዎችን፤ የስልጠና ሰነዶች፤ እና ከአዋጆቹን ጥራዝ ጋር እንዲደርሳቸው አድርጓል፡በቀጣይም አጫጭር ህጎቹ እና አለም አቀፍ ተሞክሮዎቹ ላይ ለሪፍሬሽንግ የሚሆን መድረኮችን ከባለሙያዎቹ እና ከ International Foundation for Election System/ IFES ጋር በመተባባር አስፈላጊውን በቂ ዝግጅት በቀጣይነት ያደርጋል፡፡

በመጨረሻም ፍርድ ቤቱ ፍትህን በ6ኛው አገራዊ ምርጫ በተሻለ መልኩ በማረጋገጥ የተገልጋይ እርካታን እና የህዝብ አመኔታን ለመረጋገጥ እየተገ ያለ መሆኑን እና ምርጫው ውጤታማ እና ፍትሐዊ እንዲሆን ከወዲሁ መልካሙን ይመኛል፡፡

American Chimera – 30.6


“And I gave the other trophy to that giant spider all over the news.” The interrogator laughed and picked up her cans once more. “I fucking ended the Chimera war. I watched Dr. Kim die. I fucking found the American Chimera who, through no fault of her own, was always destined to throw the planet into […]

American Chimera – 30.6

Lidetu Ayalew


Lidetu to continue to defend two charges related to alleged attempt to challenge the constitutional order forcefully



Ethiopian Democratic Party announced on Friday that the leader, Lidetu Ayalew, is released from prison on 30,000 birr bail.  He was charged with “illegal possession of firearms,” and ‘attempting to overthrow federal and regional government forcefully. He has been in jail since the days following the assassination of singer Hachalu Hundesa on June 29.  His party announced that it was the supreme court in the Oromo region of Ethiopia that ruled Lidetu be released on 30,000 Ethiopian Birr bail.  It means that he will continue to defend himself against the charges mentioned above from outside the prison cell.  A court in East Show zone ruled a few months ago that he be released on 100,000 birr bail for the charge related to “illegal possession of firearms.”  However, police defied the court order and Lidetu had to remain in prison until Friday morning this week.  He is said to have appeared in court about 41 times since his arrest about five months ago.  The second charge was laid after police retained him against court order, according to information from his party. He was particularly implicated in alleged involvement in coordinating Youth in Bishoftu (Debre Zeit), where he lives, for protest. Lidetu denied the charges.  “On behalf of my party and our members, I would like to express sincere gratitude to lifeline lawyers Abduljabar Hussien,Mohammed Jimma, Gemechu Gutema and Ashenafi Anteneh,” said Adane Tadesse who is president of Ethiopian Democratic Party.  Lidetu Ayalew is founder of Ethiopian Democratic Party and led  the party for many years. He tends to be critical towards Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.  He thinks Abiy Ahmed’s mandate as Prime Minister of the country ended on September 30 of this year — a position that the nearly defunct Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) strongly held. The political stand is based on the view that postponement of the sixth general election was illegal for “it violates the constitution.